Search results for "rule of recognition"
showing 5 items of 5 documents
La norma di riconoscimento come ideologia delle fonti
2015
The essay argues that the rule of recognition, as it has been conceived by H. L. A. Hart, is either a redundant, and hence mostly useless, concept, or it is a concept with limited explanatory potential - in either case, at best a concept whose scope is much narrower, in contemporary legal systems, than the one envisaged by Hart. It will also be argued that the rule of recognition, if subject to a possible (and plausible) reformulation, can nevertheless play a significant, non-redundant role. This, however, will require to assign the rule of recognition a rather different job than the one proposed by Hart, as well as by most post-Hartian positivist literature, namely it will require to locat…
Consuetudine: un’analisi concettuale
2014
In civil law systems, statutes and other legal texts sometimes refer to ‘custom’. In international law, it is undisputed that ‘custom’, alongside with treaties or conventions, is one of the main legal sources. The bulk of this paper is devoted to an attempt at answering a single, simple question: what is custom? What is it that statutes and other legal materials refer to, when they refer to ‘custom’? In answering this question the beginning of wisdom is to realize that there is no single, unique concept custom. ‘Custom’ designates different phenomena, which should be carefully distinguished. It is, then, possible to mould several concepts of custom, and customary rule. In the first, longer …
Farewell to the Rule of Recognition?
2011
Resumen:En este articulo se argumenta que la regla de reconocimiento, tal comofuera concebida por Hart, es o bien un concepto redundante —y en consecuenciainutil— o un concepto limitado en su poder explicativo. Encualquier caso, se trata de un concepto cuyo alcance es, frente a los sistemasjuridicos contemporaneos, mucho mas estrecho de lo que Hartpudo imaginar. De igual modo se argumenta que la regla de reconocimiento,en alguna de sus posibles (y plausibles) reformulaciones, puedetener a pesar de todo un papel significativo y no redundante, pero solamentesi se emplea en un sentido radicalmente distinto al que propusoHart o que se propone en buena parte de la literatura positivista posthart…
Rule of Recognition, Convention and Obligation. What Shapiro Can Still Learn From Hart’s Mistakes
2012
Shapiro works out a version of legal positivism, taking as its starting point Hart’s practice theory of law. Some serious limits of Hart’s practice theory of norms concern the conception of legal obligation and normativity of law. In this chapter, I analyze the limits of Hart’s conception of legal normativity and I appraise whether the planning theory of law indicates the correct direction for overcoming them. To anticipate the conclusion, my effort is to show that Shapiro replicates Hart’s mistakes on these subject matters. This chapter is divided into three main sections. First, I will present briefly a critical reconstruction of Hart’s conception of normativity, a reconstruction which is…
Jueces y «control de calidad» de los sistemas políticos
2007
Maria.J.Anon@uv.es Este artículo trata de analizar la tesis normativa que atribuye a los jueces la función de garantía de la estabilidad de los sistemas políticos, examen que se lleva a cabo en dos planos. En primer lugar, realizo una valoración de la contribución de la regla de reconocimiento a la identidad y a la legitimidad de los sistemas jurídicos. Planteo, después, la idea de que el rasgo distintivo de la función judicial desde un punto de vista institucional y normativo no es tanto el mantenimiento de la estabilidad del orden político cuanto la garantía de los derechos, subrayando las limitaciones de la tesis analizada en este artículo en contextos de transformación del orden jurídic…